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Abstract
Our social lives are governed by trust. But how do we choose whom to trust? In this
work, based on a laboratory experiment, we explore whether building relationships in a
social network increases individuals’ level of trust. We find that social interactions direct
trust, but their impulse is not su ciently strong to result beneficial.
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1 Introduction
In the real world, trust relationships often involve more than two counterparts. Think, for
example, of the problem of an investor who can allocate a certain amount of money among
di↵erent beneficiaries. Another example may be that of a local administrator who is asked
to allocate funds, seeds or agricultural tools to some farmers (who are equally capable to
exploit what received). Such farmers are expected (but not forced) to return something to
the administration which may be part of the production or support in an election. The
administrator might decide to invest in only one beneficiary or, alternatively, to invest in
more than one beneficiary. Clearly, a rational investor will allocate resources to a party that
is more likely to honour the trust by using the profits generated by the investment to repay
the moral debt.1
But how do we choose whom to trust? Or, equivalently, what makes a potential beneficiary
appear more trustworthy than others? In reality, economic actors are socially embedded and
are likely to be influenced by social interactions.
Experimental studies of social capital e↵ects on trust and trustworthiness commonly em-
ploy the two-player trust game (see Berg et al., 1995). In that game, a first-mover, the
‘trustor’, decides how much to send to a the second-mover, the ‘trustee’, who receives more
than it has costed the trustor, and decides how much to return to the latter.
In this paper, we prime subjects in a social network in order to observe whether social
relationships are able to build trust and convey trustworthiness. In our experiment, groups
of six participants, identified by an icon, first play a trust-like game; then they interact in a
network formation game for a number of rounds; finally, they play the trust-like game again.
We build on an earlier article, Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010), which finds that donors o↵er
more to those with whom they have been linked more frequently in the network.
As in Di Cagno and Sciubba, we consider groups of six participants, who act as trustors
and choose whom to trust. While in their experiment each trustor can choose only one
trustee, we allow for the possibility that a trustor may allocate trust to every other player.
1Trust is at the heart of investment decisions. Even when a donor gets nothing in return, as in angel
investments, higher levels of trust and trustworthiness have been associated with larger investments (Wong
et al., 2009; Sudek, 2006; Kelly and Hay, 2003).
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Each trustee then decides how much to return to the trustor (of an amount equal to three
times the sum received, as in the original trust game).
Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010) use a between-subject design with three treatments: one in
which participants play a trust game before some rounds of a network formation game; one
in which participants play the trust game after the network formation game; one in which
participants only face a trust game. Our experiment is based on a within-subject design,
where each participant’s trust-like choices are observed both before and after the network
game is played.
Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010) focus mainly on the e↵ect of social networks on trustwor-
thiness, in that in their experiment trust is somewhat concealed. In fact, in the trust part of
their experiment, donors are essentially faced with several decisions: whether they want to
make an o↵er; in case, who is the recipient of the o↵er (only one of the other five group mem-
bers); and finally the amount to o↵er. This way, only the group member whom the trustor
deems the most trustworthy is identified. Therefore, not only changes in the level of trust
with respect to the other participants (the ones not selected as trustee) are undetectable, but
also it is impossible to trace the way in which the network formation changes the trustor’s
preferences (if not at a population level because of the between-subject design).
Instead, this work aims attention at trust. In order to identify the determinants of trust,
we consider an involuntary trust game (McCabe et al., 2003), where the whole amount the
trustor is endowed with must be allocated. This enables us to capture a situation where an
individual (or an institution) is committed to invest a certain sum of money, and her/his
problem is to identify one or more people who are trustworthy enough to return the funds.
Preventing trustors from keeping the whole or part of the endowment for themselves ensures
that rationality can only be exercised to recognise the allocation strategy which may earn the
most, that is by allocating trust to those who are deemed more trustworthy.
Therefore, in our experiment, allocating money to someone is equivalent to trusting them:
the more I trust someone, the more I give her/him with respect to others. For this reason,
we refer to this game as the ‘trust-allocation game’. By means of this game and our within-
subject experimental design we want to observe whether, after the network formation game, a
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trustor changes her/his trust-allocation strategy based on the social relationships established
in the network game.
We assess the e↵ects of social network formation on trust by comparing allocation decisions
made after the network formation game to allocations made before the network game. Our
aim is to identify features of social interactions that contribute to increasing trust in one (or
more) party.
Our results show that trustors choose their trust-allocation strategy depending on whether
they are playing the trust game before or after the network formation phase. When the
trust-allocation game is played after the network formation game, allocations to potential
beneficiaries are less equally distributed compared to the baseline. Furthermore, an investor
is more likely to allocate resources to someone s/he has been linked with and/or someone who
has been directly linked with others more often. On the other hand, an investor is giving less
to someone who has been isolated. Therefore, social interactions do direct trust. However,
trustors rarely choose the allocation strategy that would earn them the most. In fact, the
best strategy would be that of allocating the whole endowment to only one trustee, in that
trustees’ generosity increases with the level of trust they are given. Indeed, after the network
formation game, trustors tend to favour some trustees with respect to others, and allocate
more ECUs to them but not enough to make such a change beneficial. Basically, trustors seem
to be reluctant to rely completely even on the trustee whom they deem more trustworthy.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 explains
the experimental design, including the games, treatments and procedures. Section 4 gives the
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
Trust games have been studied since the first appearance of Berg et al. (1995)’s contribution.
The most common, two-player trust game has been used to address the link between trust,
trustworthiness and socially relevant variables including gender (Eckel and Wilson, 2004;
Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Ho↵man et al., 1996; Buchan et al., 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009),
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race (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001), and social connections (Leider et al., 2009).2
The game that we consider di↵ers from standard, two-player trust games in two main
respects: it has one trustor and five trustees, and the trustor has no choice but to give out
the whole endowment.
McCabe et al. (2003) propose an ’involuntary trust game’ where the trustor has no outside
option (i.e. keeping everything by her/himself), as in our experiment, although s/he retains
a positive amount. Cassar and Rigdon (2011) analyse a trust game where a trustor allocates
an amount to each of two trustees, whom in turn decide how much to return to the trustor.
In their game, how much a trustee receives relative to the other is a measure of trust by the
trustor, in addition to the amount transferred to a trustee taken in isolation (which is also
the only possible measure of trust in the standard trust game). Our game is a simplified
version of theirs as it eliminates the latter source of trust by ‘forcing’ the trustor to give out
everything. Furthemore, the game is played with the strategy method (Selten, 1965). More
specifically, every subject in our experiment plays both roles of trustor and trustee. In the role
of a trustor, a player decides how much to allocate to every other, five trustees; as a trustee,
a player decides how much to return for every di↵erent level of investment, but irrespective
of the identity of the trustee. Burks et al. (2003) show that trust decreases when subjects
play both roles in a trust game because a trustor shifts responsibility of a trustee’s payo↵ on
random assignment of roles embedded in the strategy method.
Previous studies have considered the e↵ects of social networks on coordination and coop-
eration (Cassar, 2007), trust (Cassar et al., 2007), altruism and trust (Bran˜as-Garza et al.,
2010), contributions to public goods (Fata´s et al., 2009). All these studies have considered
exogenous social networks. In contrast, our work focuses on the behavioural consequences of
social networks developed in the lab, as in Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010) and Di Cagno and
Sciubba (2008).
Social network games similar to ours have been studied in the experimental literature on
endogenous network formation. This literature has mainly focused on network convergence
(Carrillo and Gaduh 2012) and strategies of link proposals (Callander and Plott 2005, Goeree
2See Camerer (2011) for a review of trust games studies.
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et al. 2009, Conte et al. 2015).
3 Experimental design
3.1 Procedures
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Max Planck In-
stitute of Economics in Jena (Germany). Participants were mainly students from various
backgrounds at the local, Friedrich Schiller University. Each participant was randomly as-
signed to a session and every subject played only one session.3 Upon arrival, subjects were
randomly allocated to cubicles, where they sat in front of the computer. Instructions were
read aloud and time was given to answer questions. The experiment was computerised us-
ing z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).4 Subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other
during the experiment except for interacting via computers. Subjects were randomly divided
into groups of six at the beginning of each session, and group composition was kept fixed until
the end of the session.
Subjects in each group were randomly assigned an identifying icon (that is, @, #, ¶, ±,
˜ and ÷). Each subject retained the same icon throughout the session.
The experiment was divided in three parts: a trust-allocation game, followed by at least
30 rounds of the network formation game, followed by a trust-allocation game identical to
the previous one. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed that the
experiment was divided in three parts and that they would have received instructions for each
part at the outset of the relevant part.5
Subjects were encouraged to ask for clarification after reading the instructions and at any
time during the experiment.
We ran a total of 14 sessions in three treatments: 4 in 14, 6 in 15, and 4 in 16 endowment
in the trust game. There were 30 participants in each session who were divided into 5 groups
of 6 participants each, for a total of 420 participants and 70 groups.
3Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
4We thank Albrecht Noll for expert computer programming and assistance during the experiment.
5Instructions are provided in the Appendix. The original instructions in German are available upon request.
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For the trust-allocation game, the conversion rate was 1 ECU = e0.80. For the network
formation game, the conversion rate was 1 ECU = e0.02.
Total earnings were defined by the earnings from part 1 or part 3 (the trust-allocation
games), plus the earnings from part 2. The earnings from part 2 (network formation game)
were determined by the earnings of one, randomly selected, round.
For parts 1 and 3, at the end of the experiment, one of the participants was randomly
drawn and asked to draw a ball from an urn containing two balls, one labelled with the
number 1 and another labelled with the number 3. The selected ball determined which part
of the experiment (either part 1 or part 3) was relevant for determining participants’ earnings.
Finally, the computer randomly determined the role assigned to each player and the earnings
were paid according to choices made in the selected role. The average earning was about e19.
In addition to the monies earned in the experiment, all participants received a show-up fee
of e2.50. Payments were made individually and anonymously at the end of each session.
3.2 The network formation game
We follow Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010) for the experimental implementation of the network
formation game, based on the work of Goyal and Joshi (2003).6 Players can propose links
to one another. There are two types of links: direct and indirect. A direct link implies that
two players are mutually proposing a link. An indirect link is a link to other players accessed
via an existing link (either direct or indirect). A player can be isolated by having no links -
either direct or indirect - with anyone. However, a player can earn only by linking her/himself
to others. Direct and indirect links are equally beneficial. However, direct links are costly,
unlike indirect links that are free to establish. Therefore, a profit-maximising player will seek
to establish as many indirect links as possible.
The game consists of a minimum of 30 rounds of play with a random stopping rule after
the thirtieth round.7
At the beginning of each round, the computer assigns to each players an initial endowment
6Conte et al. (2015) experimentally investigate how players establish connections using the data from the
network formation game also analysed in Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010).
7More specifically, after the 30th round, the probability of entering a further round of play is 50%.
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of 450 ECUs which is equal across participants. The network formation game develops as
a series of repeated one-shot games. Therefore, at the beginning of each round, all players
are isolated (i.e. there are no formed links among players within a group) and they are asked
whether they want to propose any link to the other participants and, in case, to whom. Each
player can propose up to 5 links. All players submit link proposals simultaneously. The
computer collects the proposals from all participants, and displays the activated links on the
screen by means of a line which connects the players who are linked. The symbol representing
a player is inscribed in a blue circle.
Each link gives 100 ECUs, while the cost of a direct link is 90 ECUs. The profit rule is:
Profit = 450 + 100⇥ number of participants reached (directly and indirectly)
  90⇥ number of direct links
Other features of the experimental version of the game are:
• Profits are displayed on the computer screen;
• The screen provides further information:
– whether the players have received link proposals (and by which players) that did
not result in a direct link because a link to those players was not proposed; and
– whether the players have made link proposals that have not been accepted.
3.3 The trust-allocation game
The trust-allocation game involved six players. These were the same players that were grouped
together at the outset of the experiment, identified by the same icons used in the network
formation game. Two identical trust-allocation games were played, i.e. one before (in part 1)
and the other after the network formation game (in part 3) .
In each trust-allocation game, all subjects were endowed with 14, 15, or 16 ECUs, de-
pending on the treatment. The game was played with the strategy-vector method. Each
subject was asked to make two decisions: an allocation decision, in the role of a trustor, and
8
a return decision, in the role of a trustee. For the allocation decision in the role of a trustor,
each subject was asked to allocate the whole endowment among the five other players (each
of which could be identified by an icon as described above). So, for each trustee in the second
trust-allocation game, the trustor could recall play in the network formation game and condi-
tion his decision upon such information. In this respect, icons used in the first trust-allocation
game were expected to carry no meaningful information. Any amount allocated to a trustee
was multiplied by three, as in most common trust games (see Berg et al., 1995).
For the return decision in the role of a trustee, each subject was asked to specify how
many ECUs s/he would return if the amount allocated would have been 1 (then of 3 ECUs),
2 (6 ECUs), 3 (9 ECUs), and so on. Note that a return decision could not be conditioned
upon any information about a potential trustor, neither in part 1 nor in part 3, since players
were not asked to state a return contingent upon the identity of a particular player, but only
upon di↵erent levels of trust.8 Given the presence of multiple trustees, a trustor earns the
sum of points returned by the five (at most) trustees.
After the experiment was over, and the random draw meant to select whether it had to
be the trust-allocation game in part 1 or the one in part 3 to be relevant for payment, the
computer proceeded to assign at random the role of the trustor to one of the six players in
the group. Her/his trust-allocation decisions were then applied to the other five players in the
group, which had been consequently selected as trustees, and their return decisions retrieved
and applied.
3.4 The game that subjects play
Although the network formation game and the trust-allocation game have been presented as
two distinct games, the combination of the two in the experiment implies that subjects play a
more complex game than just the sum of strategies of the two individual components. This is
especially true for the trust-allocation game that follows the network formation game, where
a subject playing the role of a trustor might condition her/his decisions upon observation of
choices in the network formation game.
8It is as if for each trustee all the other group members were the trustor with 20% probability.
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Given that the strategy space of the trust-allocation game following the network formation
game is significantly larger, more equilibria exist in this game compared to the trust-allocation
game that precedes the network formation. A full characterisation of the equilibria in this
game is beyond the scope of this paper. In what follows, we only focus on the subjects’ choices
in the trust games before and after the network. Our aim is to identify the impact of the
network formation on allocations and return decisions in the trust-allocation game. We can
think of the first trust-allocation game as a game in isolation, given that feedback is withheld
until the end of the experiment. In this game, a selfish trustee would return nothing to the
trustor, irrespective of what the others have received. The same outcome would occur in the
second trust-allocation game, given that is the last game in the sequence and no opportunity
for punishing an unfair behaviour is provided thereafter.
The comparison of interest is between allocation decisions in the two trust-allocation
games, given that, only when playing in the role of trustors, players in the trust-allocation
game in part 3 can condition their choices upon information of the links established in the
network formation game with respect to the identity of their co-players. More specifically, we
are interested in whether social interaction as emerged in the network formation game can
carry over to allocation decisions in the trust-allocation game, i.e. if a player in the role of a
trustor can trust more or less a particular other(s), that would be captured by the decision
to allocate more or less to a given other(s).
3.5 Treatments and trust-allocation strategies
The games played were the same across all sessions. However, for the trust-allocation games
we used three sets of parameters as endowments: 14 ECUs, 15 ECUs, and 16 ECUs. In
contrast, for the network formation game, we used the same parameters across the sessions.
We refer to games with di↵erent values of endowments as treatments.
The optimal trust-allocation strategy depends on the trustor’s preferences and on her/his
expectations on how the trustees will respond. If the trustor is rational and expects trustees
to be rational, any trust allocation would do. This is because rational trustees will return
zero, no matter how trust is allocated.
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If the trustor expects trustees to reciprocate and return positive amounts to positive o↵ers,
the optimal allocation of trust crucially depends on the trustees’s response function. If the
trustor expects trustees to return a given percentage of what they receive, a risk averse trustor
will allocate trust by splitting his endowment equally across recipients.
If, on the other hand, the trustor expects trustees to return positive amounts only in
response to very generous o↵ers, it might be optimal to allocate trust unevenly when the
trustor is risk averse.
For this reason, we take as an indicator of the trust-allocation strategy for the trustor,
the Gini concentration index of her/his o↵ers.
In the three treatments we consider, the trustor is able to implement an equal split of
trust only when the endowment is 15 ECUs. In the 14 ECUs and 16 ECUs treatments, the
amounts allocated cannot be the same across all players. More specifically, in the 14 ECUs
treatment the most equal allocation will discriminate on trustee who will be assigned one
point less than the other trustees; hence, it will assign three ECUs to four and two ECUs to
one of the other trustees. Analogously, in the 16 ECUs treatment, the most equal allocation
will favour one of the trustees by assigning her/him one ECU more than to the others; hence,
3 ECUs to all except one who will get 4 ECUs.
In the trust-allocation game in part 1, each player should have the same chance of being
the one who receives less (in 14 ECUs) or more (in 16 ECUs) than the others; since a trustor
knows nothing about the trustees (except their neutral identifying icons), s/he has no reasons
to give one particular other less or more. This choice should then be made at random at this
stage. However, after the network formation game, the icons can be used to identify who has
behaved in a particular way in the network formation game, e.g. who has been linked (either
directly or indirectly) more intensely to others, which might influence a trustor’s choice of
whom should get more or less.
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4 The allocation of trust
In the trust-allocation games, subjects are demanded to allocate their endowment m 2
{14, 15, 16} to the other 5 members of her/his group, j = 1, . . . , 5, in her/his most preferred
way.
In order to evaluate and analyse the trust-allocation choices, for each subject i, we calcu-
late the Gini’s concentration index, varying from the value 0 for an equally split endowment
to the value 2 for when the whole endowment is allocated to one single member of the group,
in treatment 15. Instead, in treatments 14 and 16, being an equal split of the endowment
unfeasible, the minima of this index take value 0.143 and 0.125, respectively. Therefore, for
the sake of comparison, we normalise the index, so that in treatments 14 and 16 it takes
values from 0 to 2 as in treatment 15.
Figure 1, top panels, displays the distributions of the Gini index in the three treatments
before the network game is played. All the histograms are characterised by a large mass at
0, indicating a clear preference (roughly 80% of the observations) for an even allocation of
trust. The remainder allocates the endowment in di↵erent, more unequal ways, but only very
seldom to one player only. This might indicate that they want to signal to the trustee that
they have preferred her/him to others and expect her/him to reciprocate by returning a fair
amount.
According to t tests, there seems to be no di↵erence in the distributions of the Gini index
between treatments (between comparison: treatment 14 vs. 15, p-value = 0.4908; treatment
14 vs. 16, p-value = 0.2204; treatment 14 vs. 16, p-value = 0.4708).9
The distributions of the Gini index in the three treatments after the network formation
game are displayed in Figure 1, bottom panels. These histograms show three more dispersed
distributions, still with a large mass at the equal split, but reduced to roughly 45%, that
is 35 percentage points less than when no social interaction had taken place among the
members of the group. Again, t tests reveal that there is no di↵erence between the three
treatments (between comparison: treatment 14 vs. 15, p-value = 0.6668; treatment 14 vs. 16,
p-value = 0.2629; treatment 14 vs. 16, p-value = 0.4294). In stark contrast, paired t tests
9All the tests in this and the following sessions are bootstrapped adjusting for clustering at group level.
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Figure 1
Histograms of Gini’s concentration index from trust-allocation game data
for part 1 (top panels) and part 3 (bottom panels) by treatment
expose that there is di↵erence in the index distributions before and after the network game
(within treatment comparison before vs. after: paired t test, p-value = 0.0000 for all the three
treatments).
Table 1, left panel, reports the number of subjects who change their trust-allocation
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Table 1
Changes in trust-allocation strategies
identical (left panel) and equal (right panel)
Treatment Treatment
14 15 16 total 14 15 16 total
C
h
an
ge No
15 91 11 117
C
h
an
ge No
55 101 60 216
12.50 50.56 9.17 27.86 45.83 56.11 50.00 51.43
Yes
105 89 109 303
Yes
65 79 60 204
87.50 49.44 90.83 72.14 54.17 43.89 50.00 48.57
total
120 180 120 420
total
120 180 120 420
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson  2 (2) = 81.0871 p-value = 0.000 Pearson  2 (2) = 3.1820 p-value = 0.204
Note: Each cell displays the absolute frequency (top) and percentage per treatment (bottom). In each panel,
the Pearson chi-squared test for the independence of rows and columns is reported.
strategy per treatment. There, ‘No’ indicates no change, ‘Yes’ that there has been a change
in strategy. It would appear that, in treatment 15, 50% of the sample has changed strategy,
while in the other two treatments almost 90%. This would account for as a striking di↵erence,
if we would not consider that, for example, the five ways in which the trustor can split the
endowment to the others in the group but one ECU (which is subtracted from one member
in treatment 14 and added to one member in treatment 16) amount to equivalent strategies
(the Gini index is the same) even if not identical; as well as the ways in which everything
can be given to only one member, whoever this is, correspond to equivalent strategies (also in
this case the Gini index is the same), except for the beneficiary which may simply be chosen
at random (at this stage, we cannot say anything about the way subjects choose to whom
to allocate what). In the right panel of the table, we control for this and we see that the
proportion of subjects who change the allocation strategy is close to 50% in all treatments.
Let us now investigate into the number of ECUs which have been allocated to trustees
before and after the network. This is displayed in Figure 2. In line with what observed
in Figure 1, we see that in part 1, trustors predominantly (77.2%) allocate 3 ECUs to the
trustees. In part 3, instead, trustors redistribute the endowment so that the number of
trustees who get a number of ECUs larger than 3 increases. Specularly, those who get less
than 3 ECUs increases as well. We note that trustors, after the network formation game,
14
tend to distribute the endowment less equally than before, but in a way to give 4 or 5 ECUs
to some, rarely more. Only in a few cases (2.5%) they assign more than 6, and in 13 cases
(0.4%) the whole sum.
Figure 2
Histograms of the ECUs allocated to each trustee
in part 1 (left panel) and in part 3 (right panel)
In summary, the results of this descriptive analysis of trust-allocation game data suggest
that there seems to be no relevant di↵erence among the three treatments either before or
after the network formation game is played. However, di↵erences emerge when we compare
how donors allocate their trust before and after the network, in that at least 50% of them
appear to change his/her own strategy, even if they rarely attach their trust to one single
trustee. Whether such changes are induced by the relationships established in the course of
the network formation game is what the econometric analysis in Section 5 is meant to shed
light on.
4.1 Analysis of responses in the trust-allocation game
We also look at responses to trust by trustees in the trust-allocation game. Figure 3 displays
box plots per received amount (already multiplied by three) before and after the network
formation game (blue and red, respectively). On average, after the network, subjects tend to
return less than before, except for when they receive only 3 ECUs (that is the proposer has
allocated just 1 ECU to them). This also emerges from paired t tests per received amount.
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All the tests have a p-value = 0.000, except for when the received ECUs are 3 and 48 with
p-values equal to 0.1203 and 0.0251. In general, in part 1, trustees tend to return 20.25%
(stand. err. 0.23) of the received amount and 17.09% (stand. err. 0.21) in part 3, on average,
which are significantly di↵erent (paired t test: p-value = 0.000) but not enormously so. A
possible explanation of this result may be an income e↵ect induced by the network formation
game, where all participants earn a positive amount of ECUs. Instead, when the trust-
allocation game is played first, subjects do not know the characteristics of the games that
they are going to face afterwards, and cannot anticipate such an e↵ect.
Note: The amount received, displayed on the horizontal axis, is already multiplied by 3.
Dots are outside values.
Figure 3
Box plots of the amount returned in the trust-allocation game
in part 1 (blue boxes) and part 3 (red boxes) per amount received
The mean earnings from the trust-allocation game are 8.424 (stand. dev. 3.396) in part 1
and 6.419 (stand. dev. 3.309) in part 3. Their distributions are significantly di↵erent according
to a paired t test (p-value = 0.000). In 310 cases (73.8%), trustors earn less after the network,
and in only 56 cases (13.3%) they earn more.
Is the trustworthiness built in the network game well deserved? In other words, is it
16
Note: Capped spikes represent standard errors.
Figure 4
Average proportion of what returned with respect to allocations
in part 1 (blue boxes) and in part 3 (red boxes)
convenient for the trust-allocator to change her/his strategy after the network? To answer
this question, we have calculated the earnings for each player in the trust-allocation game
in the role of trustor from the strategies submitted after the network, and the earnings s/he
would have got after the network, had s/he adopted the same strategy used in the trust-
allocation game before the network.
The mean earnings from the strategies adopted before the network formation game would
have been 6.517 ECUs (stand. dev. 3.031), those adopted after were worth 6.419 ECUs
(stand. dev. 3.309). The two distributions are not significantly di↵erent (paired t test, clus-
tered at group level: t = 0.163, p-value = 0.871).10
Figure 4 shows the scatterplots of the proportions of the amount returned per received
amount. Whenever the trust-allocation game is played, either before or after the network,
the proportion of ECUs returned to the trustor is larger, on average, the larger the amount
allocated. Had the trustors allocated the whole endowment to only one trustee or at most
10In 129 cases (30.71%), trustors earn less by changing strategy (the di↵erence is -2.217 (stand. dev. 1.713));
in 106 cases (25.24%), instead, they earn more (the di↵erence is 2.311 (stand. dev. 2.108)). For 185 trustors
(44.05%), it does not make any di↵erence either because they have not changed the strategy at all or because
the strategy adopted after the network was worth exactly as much as that chosen before the network.
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(but less e ciently) split it equally between only two trustees, they would have maximised
their expected earnings, and certainly gained with respect to the equal split so popular in
part 1.11 Instead, trustors in part 3 mainly favour and discriminate one or two trustess by
only 1 or 2 ECUs. By doing this, they seem to understand that by allocating more trust
to a trustee they would earn her/his gratitude and, consequently, a larger amount of ECUs
returned. However, they do not seem to be su ciently committed to this idea or the trustees
do not seem to have conveyed trustworthiness in the network so decisively to earn the trustor’s
complete trust.
The result about trustees returning less to the trustor after the network formation game
is in stark contrast with what Di Cagno and Sciubba find. They interpret the fact that trust-
worthiness is higher after social interaction as evidence of an ‘information value’ of network,
whereby getting to know others provides information on their type and expected trustwor-
thiness. In our setup, where trustees do not know the identity of the donor, the level of
trustworthiness only depends on the received amount, suggesting that the higher level of
trustworthiness in Di Cagno and Sciubba is due to subjects behaving as conditional coopera-
tors rather than to the ‘information value’ of the network. However, we have to note that the
two games (the standard trust game in one case and the trust-allocation game in the other)
are di↵erent. In our game, after the network game, trustees, who now have collected infor-
mation about the other group members (and may have formed beliefs about the other group
members’ trustworthiness), may free ride relying on the others’ generosity. Such a behaviour
cannot be observed in Di Cagno and Sciubba where only one trustee was the recipient of
the donor’s trust, and, therefore, may have felt compelled to remunerate a familiar and kind
trustor.
5 The econometric model of trust allocation
Here, we describe the econometric model that we use to fit the data from choices on the
allocation of trust.
11For example, in treatment 15, the equal split earns 8.2845 and 6.3225 ECUs, on average, in part 1 and 3,
respectively. Instead, allocating all the sum to only one trustee would earn the trustor, on average, 9.96 and
8.92 ECUs, respectively.
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For this purpose, let us try to figure out subject i (the trustor-allocator) faced with the
other 5 group components, j = 1, . . . , 5, to whom s/he is asked to allocate 1 ECU of trust.
The preferences in terms of trust of the trustor with respect to these co-players are eval-
uated as
vij = uij + ✏ij =  
0xij + ✏ij (1)
Here, uij is the deterministic component of the trust preference function, which is a linear
combination of the characteristics of i and j and their relationship, xij , linked by the vector
of coe cients   representing the e↵ects of such characteristics on i’s evaluation of j’s trust-
worthiness; ✏ij is a random component, independent and identically distributed as a Gumbel
distribution (see McFadden 1974).
Suppose that i is asked to choose to whom of the 5 co-players s/he wants to allocate
1 ECU of trust. Then, i assigns the 1 ECU to the j whose evaluation is highest. Finally,
suppose that this operation is repeated m times. Then, the likelihood contribution of subject
i is
Li =
mY
i=1
5Y
j=1
p
mij
ij (2)
Here, mij , with
P5
j=1mij = m, is the number of ECUs that i assigns to co-player j in m
trials. This model is known as Grouped Conditional Logit.
The probability that subject i gives the 1 ECU worth of trust to subject j among his/her
5 co-players is
pij =
exp (uij)P5
j=1 exp (uij)
(3)
Guimara˜es et al. (2003) and Guimara˜es and Lindrooth (2007) show that, by interpreting
the mijs as count variables following a Poisson distribution, this model can be estimated via
a simple Poisson regression. However, all the variables which are constant within the set of
alternatives, that means i’s fixed e↵ects and the fixed e↵ects for the group to which i belongs
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cancel out, and cannot be evaluated.12 We note that this does not mean that the model
su↵ers from omitted variable bias for not being able to control for such fixed e↵ects; on the
contrary, it is as if i’s and her/his group’s fixed e↵ects were all included in the regression, but
their estimates remained concealed.
5.1 Estimation results
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the model described in Section 5 from data col-
lected in the trust-allocation game played after the network formation game.13 Results from
the network formation game are used to control for the e↵ects induced by the relationships
established during the 30 or more rounds of play.
Table 2
Estimation results of network-induced effects on trust allocation
Specification
(1) (1-l5) (2) (2-l5) (3) (3-l5)
Proportion of times i and j have been directly linked 0.3154 0.3263 0.3537 0.3975 0.4593 0.5119
(0.1536)** (0.0943)*** (0.1333)*** (0.0848)*** (0.1381)*** (0.0896)***
Proportion of times i and j have been indirectly linked -0.3313 -0.1567 -0.2912 -0.0910 -0.2614 -0.0363
(0.1777)* (0.1043) (0.1589)* (0.0971) (0.1599) (0.0982)
Proportion of times i’s proposal was not reciprocated by j 0.2243 0.2114
(0.0848)*** (0.0538)***
Proportion of times j’s proposal was not reciprocated by i 0.2402 0.1324
(0.0845)*** (0.0545)**
Proportion of times j has been isolated -0.6842 -0.1734 -0.7663 -0.3485 -0.7858 -0.3199
(0.2441)*** (0.1562)*** (0.1814)*** (0.1189)*** (0.1825)*** (0.1201)***
Average number of j’s direct links 0.852 0.0615
(0.0319)*** (0.0232)***
Average number of j’s connections -0.0670 -0.0071
(0.0524) (0.0315)
j’s average profit -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0004
(0.0003)*** (0.0002)** (0.0003)** (0.0002)**
j’s performance in network better than i’s (yes=1, no=0) -0.2193 -0.0426 -0.2242 -0.0457 -0.2769 -0.0518
(0.1350) (0.0485) (0.1346)* (0.0485) (0.1356)** (0.0485)
j’s performance in network better than i’s (yes=1, no=0) -0.1607 0.0129 -0.1626 0.0227 -0.2118 0.0186
(0.1364) (0.0512) (0.1363) (0.0509) (0.1370) (0.0509)
Constant 1.4845 0.9952 1.9488 1.3447 1.7947 1.2177
(0.2319)*** (0.1246)*** (0.2584)*** (0.1548)*** (0.2625)*** (0.1585)***
# observations 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100
# subjects 420 420 420 420 420 420
Log-likelihood -3770.0223 -3779.0591 -3770.1486 -3780.5594 -3764.9057 -3772.3521
Note: The dependent variable is the number of ECUs assigned to other group members in the trust-allocation
game played after the network game.
The performance in the network is measured by average profits.
* p-value < 0.10; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
The table presents three di↵erent specification of the model of trust allocation (labelled as
1, 2 and 3) in which all the explanatory network-related variables have been calculated over
12For example, i’s fixed e↵ects are those describing i’s performance in the network game, his/her gender or
instruction level; i’s group fixed e↵ects include measures that describe the performance of the group in the
network game, as its connectivity, e ciency, and so on, its gender composition, etc.
13In the table, we report the specifications that, we believe, better resume the estimation results. Other
specifications are available from the authors on request.
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all the rounds of play, and other three (labelled as 1-l5, 2-l5, 3-l5) in which the same variables
have been calculated over the last 5 rounds of play only.All the explanatory variables are
described in Appendix B
In all the three specifications the ‘proportion of times i and j have been directly linked’ has
a positive and statistically significant e↵ect on the number of ECUs i assigns to j. Instead,
the ‘proportion of times i and j have been indirectly linked’ has just a mild negative e↵ect
or no e↵ect at all. In specification 3, the coe cients on the ‘proportion of times i’s proposal
was not reciprocated by j’ and the ‘Proportion of times j’s proposal was not reciprocated
by i’ are both positive and significant. These results suggest that what matters for the trust
allocator is a direct, persistent relationship not one that evolves via mediators. What matter
as well is not that link requests have been successful but the fact that both players have made
attempts to be linked to each other.
As for the position of j in the network, the number of ECUs i is willing to assign to j
is negatively influenced by the proportion of times j has been isolated (i.e. ended the round
with no links) in the network game and positively by the average number of direct links
established by j, while the number of j’s connections (direct and indirect links) does not
seem to matter. We deduce from these findings that those who tend to isolate themselves do
not inspire much trust. In contrast, those who are happy to bear the costs of many direct
links seem to be perceived as very trustworthy. It is not the same for those who have many
connections: what matters are j’s direct links not her/his connections. We note that one’s
profits are calculated as a linear combination of direct links and connections. Therefore, in
Specification 3 we have included ‘j’s average profit’ among the explanatory variables instead
of j’s direct links and connections. The estimated coe cient shows that the number of ECUs
assigned to a co-player decreases with her/his average profit. It seems that being successful
does not speak for one’s trustworthiness, in that people may perceive successful individuals as
selfish and greedy, and may not be willing to rely on their capacity to appreciate their trust.
Alternatively, trust-allocators may be prone to give more to the “poor”, that is to those who
have collected less in the network formation game.
This last explanation may be in line with the results related to two dummy variables, one
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taking the value 1 if j’s performance in the network game in terms of average profits was
better than i’s, the value 0 otherwise, and the other taking the value 1 if i’s performed better
than j’s, the value 0 otherwise. The latter does not seem to matter, while the estimated
coe cient on the first is negative and significant, indicating either a competitive behaviour
of the trust allocator or a tendency to balance or redistribute earnings among the members
of the group.
The results just discussed for the specifications which rely on variables calculated over the
entire network formation game are confirmed and, sometimes, made even starker when the
variables only refer to the last 5 rounds of the game.
6 Final remarks
Trust is at the centre of our lives which are regulated by social relationships. We do not keep
money in our homes. Instead, we may decide to entrust it to one or more financial promoters
whom we may personally know, expecting that they will not betray us. Parents may need to
decide to whom of their (equally skilled) children they want to allocate their limited budget,
hoping to earn their help when they get old. Landowners may need to rely on some farmers
to cultivate their land counting on a return from the harvest.
Can trust be built and trustworthiness be conveyed in a social environment? If so, how?
These are the questions we have tried to answer via a laboratory experiment.
In our experiment, we have used a modified version of the involuntary trust game, which
we have named the ‘trust-allocation game’, in which we have not allowed trustors to allocate
anything to themselves. Instead, we have imposed on them to allocate the endowment to
di↵erent people, to whom they may or may not be socially connected. Basically, we have
created a framework in which being rational simply means allocating trust to those who we
deem more trustworthy.
Participants have been organised in groups of six. The number of ECUs allocated to a
group member by the trustor has been considered a measure of her/his level of trust towards
that individual. We have observed that at least 50% of trustors change their initial, rather
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uniform distribution of trust in favour of allocations less equally distributed, after a number
of rounds of a network formation game, in which group members get to know each other via
direct and indirect links and network architectures.
Given the choices of the trustees on the amount of ECUs to return to the trustor for each
possible amount received, it appears that it would have been convenient for the trustor to
concentrate the amount donated in the hands of one or (at most) a couple of trustees both in
the trust-allocation game played before and that played after the network formation game.
It is likely that a trustee who has been assigned more ECUs than others may feel gratified
and reciprocate by rewarding the trustor.
After the network formation game, trustors seem to do so by redistributing their trust in
favour of those with some characteristics emerged throughout the network formation game.
However, trustors do not seem to be su ciently willing to confide in a single trustee, who
may have not have inspired su cient trustworthiness to deserve the level of trust necessary
to make the post-network redistribution beneficial to the trustor.
In conclusion, getting to know each other in a social environment has proven profitable
to the trustees who have been able to convey more trustworthiness in the network formation
game, but disadvantageous (or unprofitable) to the trustors who have not been willing to rely
on them completely.
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Appendices
[These appendices are part of the supplemental material accompanying this
paper]
A Experimental Instructions in their English translation
General instructions
Welcome to this experiment. The results of the experiment will be used for the purpose
of academic research and will be published in a way that preserves your anonymity.
The funds for this research have been provided by the Max Planck Institute of Economics.
The experiment is straightforward. There is a participation fee of e2.5. In addition, you may
earn a considerable amount of money, depending partly on the decisions that you make during
the experiment and partly on the decisions of your partners. The participation fee and any
amount that you may earn in the experiment will be paid to you in cash immediately at the
end.
The experiment is composed of three parts, labelled as ‘part 1’, ‘part 2’ and ‘part 3’. The
instructions for each part will be distributed at the beginning of each part. Please read these
instructions carefully before you turn to the computer. The instructions for each part will
continue to be available to you for reference throughout the experiment.
The payment rule is the following. At the end of the experiment, we will ask one of the
participants to draw a ball from an urn containing two balls, one labelled with the number
1 and another labelled with the number 3. The selected ball determines which part of the
experiment (either part 1 or part 3) is relevant for determining your earnings. In other words,
only the payo↵s obtained in one of the two mentioned parts of the experiment will be paid.
Instead, the payo↵ you obtain in Part 2 is paid to you and all the other participants with
certainty.
In each part, earnings are expressed in ECUs (Experimental Currency Units). The con-
version rate for the ECUs you get from part 1 of the experiment is 1 ECU = e0.80. For
the tokens you get from part 2, the conversion rate is 1 ECU = e0.02. For the tokens you
get from part 3, the conversion rate is 1 ECU = e0.80.
At the beginning of the experiment, you are placed in a group of 6 participants. The 6
participants in each group will play together in all the three parts of the experiment. Each
of the 6 participants is randomly assigned an icon (@, #, ¶, ±, ˜, ÷) by the computer. This
will identify you and your partners throughout the experiment.
The icons representing you and your co-participants are displayed on the screen in a circle.
Please, notice that such a representation is only meant to ease the graphical representation
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of the results of your decisions, and it is not meant to suggest or imply anything concerning
your decisions.
Note that there are neither right nor wrong ways to complete the experiment. You may
take as much time as you need to complete the experiment.
As already said, the experiment is divided in three parts. We are now giving you instruc-
tions for part 1.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to help you.
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Instructions for part 1
In this part of the experiment, in your group there are two roles: one donor and five
beneficiaries. The role you take on will be revealed to you only at the end of the experiment,
when it will be determined by a random draw. Therefore, now you are asked to play both
roles: firstly the role of the donor; secondly the role of the beneficiary.
As a donor, at the beginning of this part, you are assigned an endowment of 15 (14 or 16)
ECUs (equal across participants). You are asked to allocate all the 15 (14 or 16) ECUs of
your endowment among the other 5 participants (referred to as beneficiaries) in your group
in the way you prefer. You cannot keep any token for yourself.
Each beneficiary receives the o↵ered amount multiplied by three. For example, if partic-
ipant @ decides to allocate:
• 3 ECUs to participant #, # receives 9 ECUs;
• 5 ECUs to participant ±, ± receives 15 ECUs;
• 2 ECUs to participant ˜, ˜ receives 6 ECUs;
• and so on.
As a beneficiary, you do not receive any endowment. After the distribution phase, you
and all the other participants in your group are given the chance to give back to the donor
part of the tokens received. Any number of ECUs can be given back, even 0 ECUs or the
whole amount but not more than what you have received.
The computer will ask you to specify the number of ECUs you are willing to give back if
you are chosen as a beneficiary of di↵erent hypothetical amounts. In the specific, you will be
asked how many ECUs you want to give back to the donor, if you receive 6 ECUs, 9 ECUs,
12 ECUs and so on. Please, note that the screen displays the hypothetical amounts received
already multiplied by 3.
Your payment in this part
At end of the experiment, only one of the 6 participants in your group is selected as the
donor and his/her allocations are implemented for real. Consequently, the other 5 participants
are the beneficiaries of the donor’s allocations. The beneficiaries’ decisions concerning the
amounts to give back to the donor in the hypothetical scenarios are then matched with the
donor’s allocations and the final payo↵s are determined.
For example, suppose that @ is selected as the donor and that s/he has allocated 4 ECUs
to ÷, and that ÷ has stated that s/he would have given 5 ECUs back, had he received 12
ECUs (4 ECUs multiplied by 3) from the donor. In this case, for this particular pair of
participants, @ (the donor) obtains 5 ECUs and ÷ 7 ECUs (12 ECUs - 5 ECUs).
28
Be careful: beneficiaries are asked to state the amount of ECUs they want to give back
to the donor without knowing the identity of the donor (the donor can be any of the other 5
participants in the group). In fact, the participant whose allocations are implemented (who
actually plays the role of the donor) is only revealed at the end of the game via a random
selection (operated by the computer) of one of the 6 participants in your group.
In summary, your earnings in this part of the experiment are determined as follows:
a) if you are the selected donor, then you earn the sum of the amounts which are returned
to you by all your beneficiaries (this amount can be 0 if none of the beneficiaries has
returned any ECUs to you);
b) if you are a beneficiary (that is you are not selected as the donor), you earn 3 times the
amount received by the selected donor minus what you stated you are willing to send
back to the donor. Please, note that, if the selected donor has not assigned any ECUs
to you, your earnings in this part of the experiment is zero.
29
Instructions for part 2
This part of the experiment lasts a random number of rounds: there are at least 30 rounds
to be played, after which, and for every further round, a lottery administered by the computer
determines whether there is going to be an additional round in this part or whether this part
of the experiment is over. The lottery is represented by red and green lights flashing on the
screen. If the lights stop on green, your group will play another round; it they stop on red,
this part of the experiment is over. The lights will stop either on green or on red with equal
probability.
At the beginning of each round, the computer assigns to you an initial endowment of 450
tokens which is equal across participants.
As already explained, every participant in your group is represented by the same icon as
in the previous part.
At the beginning of every round all participants are isolated, i.e. there are no formed links
among participants within a group. In each round, the computer asks you whether you want
to propose any link to the other participants and, in that case, to whom. You may propose
0, 1 or more links (up to 5). All participants submit link proposals simultaneously (that is,
without observing the other participants’ link proposals). You can choose to whom to propose
a link by clicking on the relevant boxes corresponding to each of the other participants in the
window on the right-hand side of your screen.
When all participants in your group have submitted their link requests, the computer
collects the proposals from all participants, and displays the activated links on the screen by
means of a line which connects the participants who are linked.
Links can be direct and indirect. A direct link between two participants is established if
and only if both participants propose a link to each other. An indirect link between two
participants is established when the two participants are not directly linked but they are both
directly linked to either another participant or a chain of participants.
Given the link proposals submitted by all participants in a round, suppose that the fol-
lowing links are activated.
• # is directly linked to ± and indirectly to @ and ˜
• @ is directly linked to ± and ˜ and indirectly to #
• ÷ has no direct or indirect links
• ˜ is directly linked to ± and @ and indirectly to #
• ± is directly linked to #, @ and ˜
• ¶ has no direct or indirect links
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Activating a direct link has both costs and revenues, which are equal across participants.
Each direct link that you manage to activate costs 90 ECUs. Please, notice that links
proposed but not activated (because not proposed back by the participants to whom they
have been proposed) bear no cost. Please, note that indirect links have no cost.
For each link that you manage to activate, both direct and indirect, you earn 100 ECUs.
You also earn 100 ECUs for each participant to whom you are indirectly linked with. It may
happen that you are linked to some participants both directly and indirectly, and you may
also be able to reach a participant indirectly through di↵erent chains of participants. In such
a case, you only earn the 100 ECUs for having reached that participant once. In other words,
you earn 100 ECUs for each participant that you manage to be linked with through both your
direct links and the links activated by other participants.
In summary, in each round, your profit is computed as follows:
Profit = 450 + 100⇥ number of participants reached (directly and indirectly)
  90⇥ number of direct links
In the example portrayed in the previous figure, participants’ profits are:
• # 450 + 100 ⇤ 3  90 ⇤ 1 = 660
• @ and ˜ 450 + 100 ⇤ 3  90 ⇤ 2 = 570
• ÷ and ¶ 450 + 100 ⇤ 0  90 ⇤ 0 = 450
• ± 450 + 100 ⇤ 3  90 ⇤ 3 = 480
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At the end of each round, you will see an overview of whom you are directly and / or
indirectly connected to on the screen in front of you. The computer will also calculate your
earnings for this round and display them on the left side of the screen. The information on the
right side of your screen indicates whether and from which player you have received connection
suggestions (please note the gray checkmarks), but there was no direct connection between
them because you did not suggest a connection. Below you can see your own connection
suggestions, which were not replied by the respective player.
At the end of each round, the computer will initiate a new round and you will be able to
choose again to whom to link.
Your payment in this part
At the end of the experiment, one round of the several (30 or more) played in this part
of the experiment will be randomly selected by the computer for payment. You will be
paid according to the profit obtained in that round computed in the way explained above in
agreement with your and your partners’ link proposals.
Remember that the earnings obtained in this part of the experiment are always paid.
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Instructions for part 3
This part of the experiment is identical to part 1. For details on this part, its rules and
the way payments are determined, you are referred to the instructions for part 1. Obviously,
you are free to make choices di↵erent from those submitted in Part 1.
Please, remember that at the end of the experiment, we will randomly select (by drawing
a ball from an urn) only one of the two parts (Part 1 and Part 3) for payment. Part 2 is paid
with certainty.
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B Description of the explanatory variables used in the fitting
of the econometric model on trust-allocation data described
in Section 5
All the variables described here are calculated from the data collected from the network
formation game, either from all the rounds of play or only the last five. We also report the
correlation between the two distributions.
Note: Correlation 0.8453
Figure B.1
Proportion of times i and j have been directly linked
in all rounds of play (left panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
Note: Correlation 0.8129
Figure B.2
Proportion of times i and j have been indirectly linked
in all rounds of play (left panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
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Note: Correlation 0.7308
Figure B.3
Proportion of times i’s (j’s) proposal was not reciprocated by j (i) across all
rounds of play (left panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
Note: Correlation 0.5932
Figure B.4
Proportion of times j has been isolated across all rounds of play (left
panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
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Note: Correlation 0.8346
Figure B.5
Average number of j’s direct links
across all rounds of play (left panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
Note: Correlation 0.6157
Figure B.6
Average number of j’s connections
across all rounds of play (left panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
36
Note: Correlation 0.7150
Figure B.7
Histogram of j’s average profit
across all rounds of play (left panel) and in the last 5 rounds (right panel)
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